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From the beginning of the marriage, her husband abused
her. He raped her almost daily, beating her before and during each
rape. He once dislocated her jawbone because her menstrual
period was fifteen days late. When she refused to abort a
pregnancy, he kicked her violently in her spine. Once, he kicked
her in her genitalia, causing her severe pain and eight days of
bleeding. She fled the city with their children, but he tracked them
down and beat her unconscious. He broke windows and mirrors
with her head. He told her that if she left him, he would find her,
cut off her arms and legs with a machete and leave her in a
wheelchair. She attempted suicide, but was unsuccessful. She
contacted the police three times, but they did not respond. A judge
denied her protection, saying that the court "would not interfere in
domestic disputes."' She finally left him, fled to the United States,
and applied for political asylum.
Should women like Rodi Alvarado Pefia, described above,
be eligible to receive political asylum in the United States?2 To be
J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A. History,
cum laude, Yale University 1999. The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Professors Fernando Chang-Muy, Louis S. Rulli and Catherine Struve for their
ratience, guidance, enthusiasm, and 
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In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10 (BIA 1999, Att'y Gen. 2001).
2 Ms. Alvarado was granted political asylum by an immigration judge in 1996,
but the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA," "Board") reversed the asylum
grant in 1999. Id. at 927-28. Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA
holding in January 2001 and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
her Proposed Rule of December 7, 2000. Id. at 906; see also infra note 8 and
accompanying text. In February 2003, then Attorney General John Ashcroft
certified Ms. Alvarado's case to himself for a legal decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 103(a)(1). Amid great political controversy and under pressure from
Congress, see infra note 84 and accompanying text, Ashcroft ultimately declined
to take action on Ms. Alvarado's case. See Press Release, Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies, University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
Landmark Decision Delayed Once Again (Jan. 21, 2005) at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/media/cgrs-release 1-05 .pdf
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eligible for political asylum, an applicant must meet the definition
of refugee. 3 Ms. Alvarado faces brutal violence-perhaps death-
at the hands of a known abuser that the state refuses to control.
4
But she does not fear persecution on account of the four traditional
grounds for political asylum: race, religion, nationality or political
opinion. 5 To bring Ms. Alvarado within the purview of the fifth
enumerated ground for political asylum, "membership in a
particular social group," the immigration judge found that Ms.
Alvarado belonged to a class of "Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who
believe that women are to live under male domination.' 6 As of the
time of this writing, roughly nine years after the Immigration
Judge initially granted political asylum to Rodi Alvarado, the
question of whether the United States will grant refuge to women
(reporting that the Attorney General announced on January 19, 2005 that he
would remand Ms. Alvarado's case, unchanged, to the BIA upon leaving office
later that month).
3 Federal law defines a refugee as one "who is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of [her home] country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2004 Supp.).
4 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 at 911.
5 The bulk of Ms. Alvarado's claim is centered on her claim of belonging to a
"particular social group," although she raised imputed political opinion elements
in her original claim. Indeed, the immigration judge granted asylum on both the
social group and political opinion theory. However, as this paper will focus on
the social group category generally and not Ms. Alvarado's claim, imputed
political opinion related to domestic violence cases will be left for other works.
See generally, Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender
Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL
L. REv. 777 (2003); Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a
Particular Social Group" Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM.
J. GENDER& L. 167 (2001).
6 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 at 911. This creative usage of the "social
group" ground for political asylum follows an expansive trend over the past
fifteen years during which time the "social group" construction has grown to
encompass sexual orientation-based asylum, gender-based asylum in the form of
Female Genital Mutilation, and others. See generally Kathleen Anderson,
Expanding and Redefining "Membership within a Particular Social Group":
Gender and Sexual Orientation Based Asylum, 7 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L.
ANN. 243 (2001); Peter C. Godfrey, Note, Defining the Social Group in Asylum
Proceedings: The Expansion of the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of
Refugees, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 257 (1994).
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who suffer severe domestic violence by uncontrolled abusers
remains unanswered.
In re R-A- illustrates a difficulty posed by "particular social
group" jurisprudence: the absence of a clear legal framework
defining cognizable "social groups" has resulted in inconsistent
and unpredictable interpretations of the law.7 In December 2000,
amid the conflict surrounding In re R-A-, outgoing Attorney
General Janet Reno published a Proposed Rule that would codify a
regulatory definition of "social group" and would enumerate six
guiding factors designed to achieve a consistent application of the
8law. In February 2004, after more than three years of delay
during which a new Administration took office and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was legislatively
eliminated,9 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
expressed its intention to finalize the Proposed Rule.' 0 At the time
of this writing the DHS has not taken action.
7 BIA decisions on social group matters tend towards uniformity, but appeals
from the BIA go to Federal Courts of Appeal having jurisdiction over the
applicant. The Courts of Appeal have disagreed in many social group cases,
issuing conflicting guidance on legitimate groups and the proper standard for
analysis. Compare Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on
Acosta immutable characteristic test to uphold particular social group of Iranian
women with well-founded fear of persecution based solely on gender) with
Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (relying on Sanchez- Trujillo
voluntary associational test to determine that no group of Iranian women could
have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on gender).
8 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76598 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.15, 208.16) [hereinafter
"Proposed Rule"]; the regulation also defines "persecution," clarifies "changed
circumstances" procedural application, provides guidance on a government's
unwillingness or inability to control a non-state actor, codifies imputation
doctrine, clarifies the applicable standard to mixed motive cases, and implicitly
provides foundation for domestic violence-based political asylum as in Rodi
Alvarado's case. These vital developments are beyond the scope of this paper.
9 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
2205, sec. 47 1(a) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 29 1(a)) ("Upon completion
of all transfers from the Immigration and Naturalization Service as provided for
by this Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of
Justice is abolished.")
10 Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's Eligibility for
Relief at 5, In re Rodi Alvarado-Pena, Respondent, Before the Attorney General
(Feb. 19, 2004), at
http://w3.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/dhsbriefra.pdf [hereinafter
"DHS's R-A- Brief'].
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This paper will argue that, if finalized as proposed, the
Proposed Rule will: (1) expand social group jurisprudence to
include a narrow class of domestic violence-based political asylum
claims as intended but will not produce the "flood" of domestic
violence-based claimants as feared by some commentators; (2)
maintain and slightly expand the social group category in general,
preserving this critical flexibility in U.S. asylum law that allows
the law to respond to unprecedented forms of persecution; and (3)
fail to achieve the intended goal of uniform jurisprudence because
the proposed rule does not adequately resolve pre-existing
interpretational disputes.
Part I of this paper examines emerging social group
jurisprudence in the U.S., focusing on the inconsistent
interpretations amongst the Courts of Appeal. Part II examines the
specifics of the Proposed Rule and the changes that it would make
to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) relative to social group
jurisprudence. Part 1I assesses the anticipated actual impact of
the Rule on domestic violence-based asylum seekers, other social
group claimants, and on the inconsistent interpretations by the
Courts of Appeal. The Conclusion in Part 1V advances the
proposition that, although the Rule will not achieve all of its
objectives, it is the appropriate development for the current
political-economic moment.
I. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL GROUP
JURISPRUDENCE: CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS
a. Introduction
The "social group" category-in spite of its long history
dating to the Refugee Convention of 1951--does not rest on solid
conceptual footing as do its counterparts (race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion). The literal dictionary meaning
of "social group" does little to assist in defining the scope of the
category for purposes of political asylum, whereas the dictionary
sheds some light on all other categories.' 1 The dearth of legislative
" See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 733, 757-62 (1998) (discussing the plain meaning of the words in the
refugee definition).
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history on the social group category1 2 fails to clarify the meaning,
and courts have expressed their frustration. As the Seventh
Circuit stated in Lwin v. INS, "the meaning of 'social group'
remains elusive. The legislative history behind the term . . . is
uninformative, and judicial and agency interpretations are vague
and sometimes divergent. As a result, courts have applied the term
reluctantly and inconsistently."
'1 3
While courts are frustrated by lack of guidance, advocates
have increasingly utilized the "social group" category for new
kinds of political asylum claims. In the cases cited in this section,
the following are among the "social groups" suggested: 14 Iranian
women, 15 Cuban homosexuals,
16 women brutalized by guerrillas,'
7
gay Mexican men with female sexual identities,' 8 former child
soldiers who escaped a rebel group, 19 former policemen,20 drug
traffickers, 21  immediate family members of a target of
persecution, 22 parents of Burmese dissident students, 2 3 and young
women from a particular tribe in Togo who have not been
24
subjected to Female Genital Mutilation and oppose that practice.
In adjudicating so diverse a pool of social group-based political
12 See id. at 763-74 (commenting that a search for the intent of the drafters of the
definition of "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102, leads one back to the travaux preparatoires of the Refugee Convention of
1951); see also Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, U.N. GAOR,
6th Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/19 (1951), reprinted in 3 THE
COLLECTED TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES OF THE 1951 GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 371, 377 (Alex Takkenberg &
Christopher L. Tahbaz eds., 1989) (noting that the proposal for the inclusion of a
"particular social group" category came as an amendment proposed by a
Swedish delegate with little fanfare and that the proposal received little
response).
3 Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1998).
14 Not all of these formulations were found to be legitimate "social groups."
15 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
16 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820 (BIA 1990).
17 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663 (2nd Cir. 1991).
18 Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
19 Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2003).2 0 In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1988).
21 Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992).
22 Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1993).
23 Lwin, 144 F.3d at 507.
24 In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (BIA 1996).
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asylum claims-many of which allege quite severe abuse-it is
unsurprising that courts have produced differing interpretations of
the term "social group." Courts have relied on different factors to
test the validity of a postulated social group, resulting in
inconsistent outcomes on similar claims as a result of jurisdiction.
The remainder of Part I will compare and contrast the competing
frameworks for social group analysis that have emerged from the
Courts of Appeal and the Board of Immigration Appeals and will
close by analyzing the courts' treatment claims on the basis of
gender or familial relationships.
a. The Acosta Decision and the Immutable Characteristic
Standard
In 1985, the Board heard an appeal on an application for
political asylum by a Salvadoran male who claimed fear at the
hands of the guerrillas on account of his membership in a
particular social group. 25  He defined his social group as taxi
drivers who were members of a cooperative known as COTAXI,
and other persons engaged in the transportation industry.26 Acosta
alleged that the guerrillas targeted him and his group because of
his refusal to participate in guerrilla-mandated work stoppages.
27
The Board, noting that the Refugee Convention added "social
group" as an afterthought2 8 and that the legislative history of the
provision was scant, devised its own interpretation of "social
group" that remains at the core of social group jurisprudence
today.
The Board applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which
suggests that general words used in an enumeration with specific
words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific
words. 29 The Board noted that persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality or political opinion was aimed at immutable
25 In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 216-17 (BIA 1985).
26 Id. at 232.; Acosta also raised an unsuccessful "political opinion" claim.
27 Id. at 216-17 (describing the threats received by Acosta for refusing to comply
with the stoppages.)
28 Id. at 232; see also supra note 12.
29 Id. at 233-34; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining ejusdem generis literally as "of the same kind or class").
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characteristics-characteristics that an individual cannot change or
should not be required to change. As such, the Board stated:
[W]e interpret the phrase 'persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group' to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances
it might be a shared past experience such as former
military leadership or land ownership.
[W]hatever the common characteristic that defines
the group, it must be one that the members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences.
30
Applying its interpretation of the law to the facts, the Board held
that neither the trade of "taxi driver" nor refusing to participate in a
work stoppage were "immutable" characteristics under its analysis.
Accordingly, it found the appellant's suggested social group
invalid.3 '
The Board's immutability test from Acosta set the standard
for social group jurisprudence and, indeed, is cited in most asylum
cases premised on membership in a particular social group32.
Although other courts have purported to follow the immutability
test, its application to other social group claims has not always
produced consistent results. "The Acosta-based line of reasoning
is sound and well supported. Other aspects of social group law,
however, have developed unevenly and sometimes
inconsistently.
'" 33
30 Id. at 233.
31 Id. at 234.
32 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 15-24 supra.
13 DHS's R-A- Brief, supra note 10, at 19.
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b. Consistent Aspects of Social Group Jurisprudence
Following the Acosta decision, several concepts relating to
proposed social groups emerged that are widely accepted in
American jurisprudence. These concepts emerged not directly
from the statute or the legislative history, but rather were derived
from case law of both the Board and the Courts of Appeal. The
bulk of this paper focuses on the areas where courts have found
inconsistency, but this section will discuss a few consistent
interpretations that are necessary for a complete understanding of
the current posture of social group jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most obvious prohibition on the formulation of
a valid social group is that the group cannot be defined solely by
criminal or anti-social behavior.34  In Bastanipour, an Iranian
national who was convicted of a drug trafficking crime in the
United States said that he would likely be sentenced to death in
Iran for his U.S. drug conviction, and that the death sentence
would issue from a summary proceeding at which he would have
little opportunity to defend himself 35 The Court of Appeals found
that Bastanipour could not obtain political asylum on this ground
alone because "Iranian nationals convicted of drug crimes in the
United States"-a 3roup defined by criminal activity-was not a
valid social group.
A second rule that has been widely accepted is that the
harm claimed as persecution cannot alone define the social
group. 37 Carmen Gomez, a Salvadoran woman, was repeatedly
raped and beaten by the guerrillas when she was twelve to fourteen
years old.3 8  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Board's determination that the only commonality to women
previously abused by guerrillas was gender and youth, and that
those factors taken alone do not define an adequately narrow social
34 Bastanipour, 980 F.2d at 1132 (noting that the term particular social group
should not encompass classes of criminals because such a conclusion would
intertwine persecution on the one hand and the prosecution of nonpolitical
crimes on the other).
35 Id.
36 Id; the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the BIA on other
grounds-that petitioner might have grounds for relief under INA § 212(c), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c), id. at 1133-34.
37 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
38 Id. at 662.
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group for political asylum purposes. 39 Youth, gender, and past
sexual assault, the court continued, do not make Ms. Gomez more
likely to be targeted for assault in the future. 40 Other cases have
supported this same proposition.4'
Although the harm cannot define the contours of the social
group, past experience can-in some conditions-define a social
group. The Board held in In re Fuentes that former policemen
could, in some circumstances, have a subjective well-founded fear
of persecution on account of their membership in a particular
social group.42 Merely being a policeman, even at a time when the
police and the guerrilla are engaged in active combat, is vocational
and, like Acosta, is not an immutable characteristic for purposes of
defining a social group.4 3 However, having formerly been a
member of the national police may carry attendant assumptions
about political sympathies and may constitute a particular social
group for purposes of political asylum.44
While the courts have largely agreed on the propositions
suggested in this subsection as to formulation of particular social
groups, these areas of agreement apply only to a narrow class of
social group claims. The application of the immutability test from
Acosta has proven far more problematic.
c. Departin2 From Acosta: Sanchez-Trujillo, the Voluntary
Associational Test, and Its Progeny
The year after the Board's decision in Acosta, the Ninth
Circuit heard a case that suggested a social group of working-class
Salvadoran males who had not served in the military.45 Both an
Immigration Judge and the Board denied the claim, holding that
the social group did not pass muster under the Acosta-based
'9 Id. at 664.
40 id.
41 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172 (noting in the case of a Ugandan national who
was a former child soldier that a particular social group must exist independently
of the persecution endured by the applicant and that the particular social group
must have pre-dated the persecution for said persecution to be "on account of'
membership in a particular social group).
42 In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662.
43 id.
44Id.
45 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986).
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interpretation of the statute. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the holding below, but rather than follow the Acosta
framework, it fashioned its own new test.
In the Ninth Circuit's discussion about the cognizability of
the social group suggested by Sanchez-Trujillo, it noted that the
Refugee Convention's social group category was unclear-the
legislative history of the Convention and Protocol was "generally
uninformative" relative to the definition of social group,47 and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status similarly
"provide[d] little assistance in arriving at a workable definition of
'particular social group."' 48 The Ninth Circuit decided, therefore,
to simply interpret the words of the statute in their context, with a
goal of placing some outward limit upon the social group category.
The court noted that "particular" and "social" modify the
word "group," suggesting that they function to narrow the breadth
of a "group," standing alone.49  Without citing additional
interpretational tools, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a particular
social group is a group of people: (1) closely affiliated with each
other; (2) who are actuated by some common impulse or interest;
and (3) amongst whom exists a voluntary associational relationship
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to
their identity. 50 This three-prong test came to be known as the
voluntary associational test. The Ninth Circuit only twice cited
Acosta in this decision-neither relating to the definition of social
group, but rather to the statutory meaning of well-founded fear.5'
The Ninth Circuit stood by its voluntary associational test
for over a decade, and then modified it in a case that arose in 2000.
46 id.
471Id. at 1575-76.
48 Id. at 1576.
49 Id.; the proposition is that a "group" is broadly construed; a "social group" is
narrow, excluding all groups that aren't "social," and finally that a "particular
social group" must necessarily be even more narrow.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1578. Bearing in mind the subsequent history of reliance on the Acosta
framework, the Ninth Circuit's failure to address it appears to be erroneous.
Yet, considered in light of the fact that Sanchez-Trujillo followed only one year
after Acosta and that the decisions of the Board are not binding precedent on the
Courts of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of an alternative framework is
perhaps more understandable.
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In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit employed the voluntary
associational test in overturning the Board's decision denying
asylum to a gay Mexican man with a female sexual identity. The
Ninth Circuit relied on Acosta this time, and noted that the First,
Third, and Seventh Circuits had adopted the Acosta framework as
the appropriate standard to test the cognizability of a particular
social group. 2 It further noted that no other Circuit Court of
Appeals had accepted the voluntary associational test53 and that the
Seventh Circuit had noted in Lwin that the Ninth Circuit's test,
read literally, conflicts with Acosta's "immutability"
requirement. 54  As such, the Ninth Circuit adopted a new
understanding of "social group" as one that may be based either on
the existence of a voluntary associational relationship or on the
Acosta-based immutability test.55  Rather than abandon the
voluntary associational test that it fashioned in 1986 in favor of the
widely-accepted Acosta framework, the Ninth Circuit simply
concluded that a social group could be defined under either
standard-neither would stand as the authoritative test.
d. The Board's Departure from Acosta in In re R-A-
Immediately prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Hernandez-Montiel, the BIA further confused the issue in its 1999
decision in In re R-A-. As discussed in the introduction to this
paper, Rodi Alvarado sought political asylum on the ground that
she feared persecution in the form of severe domestic violence at
the hands of her husband if she were forced to return to
Guatemala. 56  In reversing the Immigration Judge's grant of
52 Hernandez-Monteil, 225 F.3d at 1092 (citing Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766
F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985), Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239-41, and Lwin, 144 F.3d at
511-12).
53 Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals actually accepted the Sanchez-
Trujillo definition in Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640, where it cites both the voluntary
associational test and the Acosta immutable characteristic test, in a sense
anticipating the "combined" definition that the Ninth Circuit contrived six years
later in Hernandez-Monteil.
14 Lwin, 144 F.3d at 512.
55 Hernandez-Monteil, 225 F.3d at 1093.6 In reR-A-, 22 1. &N. Dec. at 911.
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political asylum, the Board did not rely on Acosta-instead it
relied on factors that were new to social group jurisprudence.
57
The Board said that a social group would likely exist if the
applicant could show that: (1) the group "is recognized and
understood to be a societal faction" 58 and (2) that, because of the
shared trait of group members, "it is more likely that distinctions
will be drawn within that society between those who share and
those who do not share the characteristic." 59 The Board noted that
the Ninth Circuit's voluntary associational test (upon which the
Immigration Judge had relied) was not supported by Board
precedent. 60 It further noted that, although Acosta's immutability
test was the appropriate starting point, the Board could consider
additional factors if it desired.6'
While the Board's authority to consider additional
probative factors is not in dispute, Acosta's precedential value
should at least mandate the consideration of its "immutability test."
Instead, after identifying the newly fashioned factors as non-
determinative, the In re R-A- Board did not conduct an Acosta
analysis. Indeed, its decision to deny Rodi Alvarado's social group
rested completely on the fact that the new factors were not
satisfied. "This departs from the sound doctrine the Board
established nearly 20 years ago in Acosta, and there is no reason
for such a departure."6 Although it appears that the Board was not
intentionally abandoning the Acosta framework, the Board's
reasoning in In re R-A- further complicated an issue already
muddled by the Courts of Appeal.
e. Handling of Family- and Gender-Based Social Groups
in the Federal Circuits
Much of the recent controversy over "social group"
expansion surrounds claims on the basis of domestic violence and
other forms of gender-based discrimination. Some have framed
social groups in relation to the nuclear family (i.e., the victim's
57 For a detailed discussion of the In re R-A- decision, see Musalo supra note 5.
58 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
59 Id.
60 id.
61 Id. at 919.
62 DHS's R-A- Brief, supra note 10, at 25.
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relation to the abuser), and others have focused on the subjugated
state of a particular gender-generally women-in certain
countries. Indeed, in Acosta, the Board suggested that some shared
characteristics defining a cognizable social group would include
"sex, color, or kinship ties,"63 setting the stage for social group
claims based on family (kinship) or gender (sex).
The Sanchez-Trujillo court stated in dicta, "[p]erhaps a
prototypical example of a 'particular social group' would consist
of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a
focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests
for most people." 64 But when confronted with a claim that was
actually based upon a family-membership social group five years
later, the Ninth Circuit held that the concept of persecution of a
social group does not extend to persecution of a family.65  The
court did not so much as make reference to its conflict with the
Sanchez-Trujillo statement.
Other circuits have found persuasive the Sanchez-Trujillo
proposition that a family constitutes a particular social group. The
First Circuit cited the Sanchez-Trujillo language in a 1992 decision
that, in dicta, agreed that a family would constitute a particular
social group.66 The following year, the First Circuit again cited
Sanchez-Trujillo (not in dicta this time around) in recognizing a
social group formulation in which the applicant feared persecution
because of the familial relationship that he shared with his brother,
who was wanted by Ethopian security forces. 67 In that case, the
record supported the proposition that Ethiopian security forces
practiced the tradition of "cherchez la famille ('look for the
family'), the terrorization of one family member to extract
information about the location of another family member or to
force the missing family member to come forward.,
68
The Seventh Circuit agreed that its case law suggested,
with some certainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable
"particular social group" in liev v. INS.69 In that case, however,
63 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
64 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
65 Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
66 Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992).
67 Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 36.
68 Id.
69 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997).
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the applicant had failed to raise a "social group" claim at the
administrative level and could not support the claim that his family
was the target of Bulgarian authorities. 70 There is, thus, a circuit
split as to whether a family may constitute a particular social group
for purposes of political asylum.
The rulings relating to gender-based claims are similarly in
conflict. In Fatin, the Third Circuit relied on the Acosta
formulation of "sex" as an immutable characteristic in holding that
"Iranian women" would constitute a valid social group.7' The
court refused to overturn the Board's holding that Fatin had not
qualified for political asylum, however, because she had not shown
a well-founded fear of persecution based solely upon that social
group.
72
Although the Acosta and Fatin opinions support the
proposition that gender, standing alone, may constitute a
cognizable "particular social group," decisions from other
jurisdictions do not concur. The First, Second, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have all addressed cases that concern "modified gender
groups" 73 and all have rejected such formulations. The inference
follows that if courts will not recognize a gender-based social
group that is narrowed by a modifier, it is highly unlikely that a
purely gender-based social group will be cognizable. The First
Circuit rejected a group of Tamil men aged 15 to 45 years old,74
the Second Circuit rejected a group of Salvadoran women who
were brutalized by guerrillas, 75 the Eighth Circuit rejected a group
76
of Iranian women who suffered harsh gender-based restrictions,
and the Ninth Circuit, in dictum, said that "men over six feet tall"
would not comprise a valid social group.
77
Regardless of the specific contours of claims based on
family or gender, confusion abounds regarding the appropriate
70 id.
71 12 F.3d at 1240.
72 Id.
73 A social group based solely on gender might be "women from country X."
The modifications to which I refer, narrow those groups to be, for example,
"women from country X who were brutalized by guerrillas." I borrow this
framework from the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
74 Ravindran, 976 F.2d at 761 n.5.
75 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
76 Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
77 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
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standard for evaluating the cognizability of a particular social
group. The confusion has raised major problems for applicants
and advocates because an applicant's success may depend on: (1)
the jurisdiction into which the applicant falls; (2) the eventual
outcome of In re R-A- or action taken on the Proposed Rule; and
(3) arbitrary factors such as which asylum officer or immigration
judge is assigned to hear a case.78
Recognizing that the definition of "membership in a
particular social group" was problematic, 79 then-Attorney General
Janet Reno proposed a rule designed to set "out a number of
generally applicable principles to promote uniform interpretation
of the relevant statutory provisions." 80 The next Part will examine
the Proposed Rule and the principles that it crafted as
interpretational tools to clarify the refugee definition of "particular
social group."
III. THE PROPOSED RULE: ESTABLISHING UNIFORM
FACTORS TO CLARIFY SOCIAL GROUP
JURISPRUDENCE
The Department of Justice (DOJ) under then-Attorney
General Janet Reno promulgated a Proposed Rule on December 7,
2000, that would amend the Asylum and Withholding Definitions
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.15, and 208.16.8 1 The DOJ
established a comment period that would end on January 22, 2001,
and the finalized rule was to follow. Although the comment period
ran in accordance with the proposal, the new administration that
took office on January 20, 2001 (particularly Attorney General
John Ashcroft) took no action to finalize the proposed rule.
The amended definitions were intended to broaden social
group political asylum to include a narrow swath of domestic
78 The dilemma is critical because, given that claimants must apply for asylum
within one year of entering the U.S., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2004); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.4(a)(2)(i)(A) (2004), an applicant is often faced with a decision between
submitting an asylum application that might trigger removal proceedings or not
making the application, preventing her (in most cases) from ever applying for
asylum due to the one year bar.
79 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76589 (calling the social group category the
"least well-defined of the five grounds within the refugee definition.").
80 Id.
81 Id. at 76588.
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violence-based political asylum claimants, including Rodi
Alvarado.82 The Rule would not have made domestic violence an
explicitly enumerated ground of political asylum. 83 Rather than
finalize the Proposed Rule, however, Attorney General John
Ashcroft expressed an intention in February 2003 to promulgate a
new proposed rule that would have precisely the opposite effect: it
would have explicitly precluded domestic violence claims from the
refugee definition and, accordingly, would have denied political
asylum to Rodi Alvarado.84  Members of Congress pressured
Ashcroft against that course of action, 85 and he ultimately took no
action. The Proposed Rule remains on the books, under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, at the time of
this writing.
With the elimination of the INS, the immigration-related
regulatory power passed from the Attorney General to the
Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary).86 Although the
Secretary did not address the status of Janet Reno's Proposed Rule
or the disposition of Rodi Alvarado's case at the outset, John
Ashcroft's recent request for renewed briefing on In re Rodi
Alvarado-Pena87 prompted a response from the Secretary. The
DHS produced a brief relating to its position on Rodi Alvarado's
application for political asylum.88 The brief cites the Proposed
Rule of December 7, 2000 and says, "This rule is now under DHS
jurisdiction, and DHS plans to finalize it promptly, in cooperation
with DOJ.' , 89 DHS maintained that it expected the Rule to clarify
the definitional aspect of "particular social group" in such a way
82 Id. at 76589, 76592-93.
83 Such a change would have to be made statutorily, which falls within the
4urview of Congress, not of the Attorney General.
rSee Patrick J. McDonnell, Domestic Abuse Reviewed as Basis for Political
Asylum, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A16.
85 Letter from forty-nine members of Congress, to John Ashcroft, Attorney
General, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2003), at
http://w3.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/advocacy/house_2-03.pdf
86 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a)(3) (2004); note, however, that the Attorney General retains
control of determinations and rulings concerning questions of law, § 1103(a)(1).
87 Att'y Gen. Order No. 2696-2003 (Dec. 8, 2003). at
http://w3 .uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/ag-briefmg 12-03 .pdf.
88 DHS's R-A- Brief, supra note 10.
89 Id. at 5.
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that some, but not all, victims of domestic violence would be
eligible for social group-based political asylum.
90
Subsection (c)(1) of the Rule9 1 would define a social group
using the "immutable characteristic test" from Acosta, including
the language identifying "sex, color, kinship ties, or past
experience" as examples. This subsection would track the Acosta
language, stating that immutable characteristics are of the type that
a member of the group cannot change, or that are so fundamental
to the identity or conscience of the member that she should not be
required to change them. The subsection then adds the proposition
from Gomez - that the social group must exist independently of the
fact of persecution (i.e., the harm cannot define the group).
Subsection (c)(2) of the Rule elaborates on the situation
where certain past experiences may define a particular social
group. The member either must have been unable to change that
past experience at the time it occurred, or the past experience must
have been so fundamental to her identity that the member could
not have been expected to change it.
9 3
Subsection (c)(3) enumerates six factors that "may be
considered in addition to" subsections (1) and (2), but that are "not
necessarily determinative in deciding whether a particular social
group exists." 94 Factors (i)-(iii) are taken from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Sanchez-Trujillo95 and factors (iv)-(vi) come from the
Board's decision in In re R-A-.
96
90 Id.
91 The Proposed Rule is reproduced in its entirety as an appendix to this article.
92 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
93 This section addresses a concern raised in Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d
533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003), where the Sixth Circuit denied a social group claim of
a young Honduran man who advanced a fear of persecution on account of his
former membership in a street gang, and also denied his claim of a social group
as a "tattooed youth." Note, again, that the language in the Rule tracks the
Acosta language.
94 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76598.
95 Whether: (i) the members of a group are closely affiliated, (ii) they are driven
by a common motive or interest, and (iii) a voluntary associational relationship
exists amongst the members; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96 Whether: (iv) the group is recognized to be a societal faction or segment of the
population; (v) the members view themselves as members of the group; and (vi)
the society in which they exist distinguishes group members for different
treatment or status than non-group members of society; see supra note 58 and 59
and accompanying text.
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In summary, the Proposed Rule suggests following the
standard set forth in Acosta, carefully avoiding invalid social
groups such as those discussed in Gomez and Castellano-Chacon,
and considering as probative (but non-determinative) factors set
forth in both the voluntary associational test of Sanchez-Trujillo
and the Board's decision in In re R-A-. The extent to which the
Proposed Rule might further complicate-rather than clarify-
social group jurisprudence will be discussed in the next section.
IV. ANALYSIS: WHAT IMPACT WILL THE RULE HAVE
IF FINALIZED AS PROPOSED?
a. Introduction
If DHS finalizes the Rule as it was proposed in 2000, what
impact will it have on the U.S. immigration system? Many think
that it would make the United States a place of refuge for women
who are severely abused and given no protection in their home
countries. Some celebrate that outcome, while others fear that a
flood of asylum seekers will further burden an already strained
U.S. immigration system. Former Attorney General Janet Reno
thought it would "promote uniform interpretation" of the statute
97
in a way that would bring clarity to a clouded jurisprudential past.
This part will argue that, if the Rule were finalized as proposed:
(1) a narrow class of domestic violence victims would qualify for
political asylum on account of membership in a particular social
group but there would be no flood of asylum seekers that would
strain the system; (2) the Rule would not function to the detriment
of social group claimants - it would either provide some clarity
and have a slightly broadening effect or simply maintain the status
quo; and (3) the Rule would not achieve its stated purpose of
achieving a more uniform interpretation of the statute. In spite of
this third argument, the Conclusion of this paper will posit that the
Rule is appropriate to the present political-economic moment and
that the Rule effects incremental change towards a more open
political asylum system that would accommodate a greater number
of those who have suffered persecution.
9' Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76589.
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b. A Narrow Class of Victims of Domestic Violence Will
Receive Asylum, but the Fear of a "Flood" is
Unsubstantiated
The proposed rule will not allow all women who suffer
from severe domestic violence to seek refuge in the United States.
A very specific factual scenario must occur if a woman 98 can
plausibly raise a colorable claim for political asylum under the
Rule, partially because of pre-existing and unchanged aspects of
the statute that prevent would-be applicants from claiming asylum
and partially because the new Rule does not explicitly state that
domestic violence is a ground for asylum. A good deal of
advocacy and creative lawyering will be necessary for each
successful claim.
As reflected in the definition of refugee from the
Convention, incorporated into U.S. asylum law through the
Refugee Act of 1980, a social group applicant must show that she
is "unable or unwilling to return to... [her home] country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of.
membership in a particular social group." 99  When the
constituent elements of the definition are examined, satisfying all
of them will be quite difficult for any applicant.
The applicant must show either a well-founded fear of
future persecution, or the existence of past persecution that creates
a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear. "Well-founded"
fear will have to meet the threshold established in previous case
law, 100 the "persecution" will have to be "extreme," 10 1 and the
applicant will bear the burden of showing that the alleged facts are
true. Claims will have to satisfy the new definition in the Rule
relating to the "severity" of the persecution, the identity of the
"actor," and will have to demonstrate the government's "inability
98 It is worthy of note that the rule would likely also support the unusual case
where a man has been subjected to extreme abuse at the hands of his wife if all
factors were satisfied. The fascinating legal question of the applicability of the
Rule to abuse within same-sex relationships, though of great import, will be left
to another article.
'9 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (2004).
1oo See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); in re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 224-233.
'01 See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996).
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or unwillingness to control" a non-state actor.'0 2 Additionally, if
the applicant could escape the abuse by relocating within the home
country, asylum will be denied.
0 3
Furthermore, the Rule does not make domestic violence an
enumerated ground for political asylum in the U.S.; indeed, the
Rule does not, in broad terms, substantially change the 
law.' 4
Applicants seeking asylum under the domestic violence aspect of
"membership in a particular social group" will need to present their
cases persuasively and-a sad reality-will need experienced legal
assistance to prevail.
Other countries that have opened their political asylum
systems to victims of domestic violence have not experienced
floods of claimants. In 1995, Canada issued gender guidelines that
made domestic violence part of their political asylum program.
10 5
That year, they had 315 applicants for domestic violence-based
political asylum, and the number of applicants has decreased
annually since that time.'
6
Even if the Rule were to generate an increase in asylum
applicants, it would likely be a small increase that, systemically
speaking, would not strain the immigration system at large.
During fiscal year 2002, there were 46,272 applications made for
political asylum in the U.S.' 0 7 Even a substantial increase of that
figure, say 5% (under 3,200 applications) would represent a small
increase to an immigration system that allots 140,000 permanent
employment-based visas and 480,000 permanent family-based
visas per annum, not to speak of temporary visas.
10 8
102 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76597-98; see also Llana-Castellon v. INS,
16 F.3d 1093, 1097-98 (10th Cir. 1994); Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56
(9th Cir. 2000).
103 See Cardenas v. INS, 294 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(3) (2004).
'04 As previously mentioned, it does not in any way change applicable statutory
law. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
105 U.S. Dept. of Justice, The R-A- Rule, Questions & Answers (Dec. 7, 2000)
(available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/rarule.htm).
106 id.
107 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, "2003
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics," (2004), at 56 (availabie at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/2003Yearbook.pdf).
1o See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2004).
[Vol. 8
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol8/iss1/4
POINTING TOWARDS CLARITY
c. A Gender-Based Example Under the New Rule
The Rule itself will allow broad discretion to adjudicators
with regard to which factors are appropriate to a given case.
10 9
Subsection (c)(1) of the Rule mandates an Acosta immutability
analysis, which is a proposition that had been in dispute for some
time. But beyond the Acosta analysis, the Rule merely codifies
several propositions that had been established by case law:
prohibiting certain invalid social group formulations and laying out
factors that may be considered in other social group analyses. It
does not appear that the Rule will function to exclude particular
classes that previously have qualified for "membership in a
particular social group," and the Rule may open the door for other
types of claims raised in this article.
It is illustrative to briefly consider a gender-based example
under the new rule. Two previous cases had formulated the social
group of "Iranian women" in their claims for political asylum.
110
Prior to the promulgation of this Rule, the Third Circuit in Fatin
held that "Iranian women" constituted a valid social group, but that
the applicant in that case had not shown that she had a well-
founded fear of persecution as a member of that group."' The
court was not convinced that she was so passionately opposed to
Iranian law that she would choose noncompliance and suffer the
consequences."' The Eighth Circuit in Safaie, on the other hand,
held that a social group of Iranian women was overbroad-that
there was no possibility that "all Iranian women had a well-
founded fear of persecution based solely on their gender."
113
Under the Proposed Rule, the "Iranian women" social
group would be subjected to an Acosta analysis. An Acosta
analysis would favor this social group, granted that it focuses on
"immutable" characteristics, such as "sex."114 But an adjudicator
may also consider the six factors in subsection (c)(3) of the
109 Such broad discretion may be a double-edged sword. An extended
discussion of its implication is in the following subsection.
"o See Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233; Safaie, 25 F.3d 636.
.. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
12Id. at 1242.
113 Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
114 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76598; see also supra notes 95 and 96 and
accompanying text.
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Proposed Rule to analyze this sort of social group." 5  Iranian
women, as a whole, are probably not "closely affiliated," but may
be "driven by a common motive or interest." They probably, on
the whole, do not have a voluntary "associational relationship," but
are certainly recognized as a "societal faction" or "segment of the
population." Some, but not all, may "view themselves as members
of the group" and most would agree that the society "distinguishes
members of the group for different treatment or status" than that
accorded to men. Of the six criteria mentioned, it appears that
arguably three would militate in favor of this social group
formulation and three against. Does that mean that the Rule
recognizes this social group, or not?
d. The Proposed Rule Will Not Achieve the Goal of
Promoting Uniform Interpretation to Create a More
Predictable Social Group Jurisprudence
The Iranian women social group example that ended the
previous section illustrates the dilemma: the situation in which an
adjudicator feels that a particular social group formulation has
satisfied the Acosta immutability standard (and does not run afoul
of the avoidable past experience
1 6 or defined by the harm 17
prohibitions), but feels that the subsection (c)(3) factors don't
clearly militate either in favor of--or against-a suggested social
group. Even if the factors were not evenly split, should a particular
factor be more dispositive than others, if so which one, and what
weight should the factors have relative to the Acosta analysis?" 18
The lack of guidance in this area is precisely why I argue
that the Proposed Rule will do little to achieve its object-to
"promote uniform interpretation of the relevant statutory
15 It is not clear in the Rule if the Acosta analysis should be dispositive under
any circumstances or if the adjudicator should always consider the permissive
factors in subsection (3).
116 Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 549.
117 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
118 There is a strong argument for certain factors being more important that
others: the first three factors (the voluntary associational test from Sanchez-
Trujillo) were originally not to be given equal weight: the first two factors were
generally afforded less weight than the third "voluntary associational" factor.
See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (describing the third factor as being "[o]f
central concern.").
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provisions." ' 1 9 The lack of guidance provided by the Rule will
promote exercises of discretionary grants or denials that may
appear arbitrary and may be explained by an adjudicator's personal
interpretation of the rule. Some adjudicators may not even have
discernable interpretational trends and will appear, rather, to
determine outcomes on the basis of a visceral, inexplicable
assessment of the applicant's credibility or, worse, on the
adjudicator's own beliefs or prejudices regarding the applicant or
the applicant's race or culture.
It is not, however, fair to reject the Rule entirely for its
failure to achieve uniformity. It is helpful that the Rule clarifies
that the Acosta immutability test must be applied in all
circumstances, and that appropriate factors to consider are those
from Sanchez-Trujillo and In re R-A-. Furthermore, other aspects
of the rule-including codifying the imputation doctrine, defining
persecution, and exploring to what extent a non-state actor must be
"uncontrolled"--will have a clarifying effect.
Despite its strengths, ultimately the Rule will encourage
adjudicators to pick and choose factors from subsection (c)(3) that
support their subjectively desired outcome. Where the adjudicator
selects which optional subsection (c)(3) factors to apply and how
to accord weight to each factor, the appellate courts will have little
legal foundation for reversal under the applicable standards of
review. Janet Reno had the right idea when she attempted to clear
up social group jurisprudence with this Proposed Rule, but seldom
if ever does a multi-factor, permissive, six-part balancing test
result in a more consistent jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION: THE RIGHT RULE, FOR NOW
In spite of the interpretational concerns raised in the
previous section regarding continued unpredictability under the
Proposed Rule, the Rule is roughly the correct path for the
DOJ/DHS to take in the current political-economic moment. The
Rule addresses the most pressing concern, one that is graphically
demonstrated in In re R-A-: that there are women suffering severe
persecution at the hands of their husbands who desperately need a
place of refuge. The Rule does a good job of staking out a position
119 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76589.
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in the middle of the road: it neither 
explicitly rejects or creates a
"domestic violence" ground of political 
asylum. This is critical
because taking one course or the 
other would likely trigger a
partisan backlash against the Rule; 
by contrast, this Rule looks as
though it might be politically acceptable 
on both sides of the aisle.
A moderate approach to political asylum 
reform is also the
correct approach because of the current 
historic moment. During
the current "War on Terrorism," 
the simple fact is that the
pendulum of American public opinion 
has swung to assume a
distinctly xenophobic position. Although 
some would argue that a
more permissive rule would not compromise 
national security,
others would retort that such a rule 
would facilitate terrorist entry
into the United States. While this 
author believes that the latter
argument is specious, its political 
ramifications could be
significant.
Furthermore, during periods of economic 
difficulty, pro-
immigration measures tend to receive 
little support from the
American people, and have unfavorable 
political ramifications.
Many Americans believe, rightly or 
wrongly, that immigrants take
jobs away from U.S. workers
.'20 Regardless of the truth of that
belief, again, it could carry significant 
political implications.
Although this Rule may be the 
correct Rule for the
moment, disparate interpretation 
of "membership in a particular
social group" will continue, and 
the DHS--or perhaps even
Congress-will revisit the "social 
group" controversy in the not-
too-distant future. Unpredictable jurisprudence 
in the social group
category does not, after all, merely 
cause intellectual dissent;
rather, it has very real consequences 
for those who are fleeing
persecution and need to know if 
an application for refuge in the
U.S. will deliver them directly 
back into the hands of their
persecutors. The DHS should finalize 
the proposed rule without
further delay and should instruct 
the Board of Immigration
Appeals to grant political asylum 
to Rodi Alvarado as the first
aslyee under the new Rule.
120 For a thoughtful discussion of the economic impact 
of immigrant labor, see
Howard F. Chang, The Immigration 
Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice, 
and
Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 759 (2003).
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF THE "SOCIAL GROUP" SUBSECTION OF THE
PROPOSED RULE
Reprinted from 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76598 (Dec. 7, 2000).
Proposed 8 C.F.R. § 208.15
(c) Membership in a particular social group.
(1) A particular social group is composed of members who
share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color,
kinship ties, or past experience, that a member either cannot
change or that is so fundamental to the identity or conscience
of the member that he or she should not be required to change
it. The group must exist independently of the fact of
persecution. In determining whether an applicant cannot
change, or should not be expected to change, the shared
characteristic, all relevant evidence should be considered,
including the applicant's individual circumstances and
information country conditions information [sic] about the
applicant's society.
(2) When past experience defines a particular social group, the
past experience must be an experience that, at the time it
occurred, the member either could not have changed or was so
fundamental to his or her identity or conscience that he or she
should not have been required to change it.
(3) Factors that may be considered in addition to the required
factors set forth in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, but are
not necessarily determinative, in deciding whether a particular
social group exists include whether:
(i) The members of the group are closely affiliated
with each other;
(ii) The members are driven by a common motive or
interest;
(iii) A voluntary associational relationship exists among
the members;
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(iv) The group is recognized to be a societal faction or is
otherwise a recognized segment of the population in
the country in question;
(v) Members view themselves as members of the
group; and
(vi) The society in which the group exists distinguishes
members of the group for different treatment or
status than is accorded to other members of the
society.
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